devcon 7 / time is all you need optimizing dutch auctions on arbitrum
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Time is all you need: optimizing Dutch auctions on Arbitrum
Duration: 00:00:00
Speaker: Alan Wu, Brad Bachu, Cody Born
Type: Lightning Talk
Expertise: Intermediate
Event: Devcon
Date: Nov 2024
Dutch auctions are a common approach in MEV-mitigating mechanism designs. However, little work has been done in exploring optimal auction execution times. Using simulations, we demonstrate how optimizing for a key metric — wait time — can achieve optimal execution without the complexity of existing systems.
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