devcon 7 / sybil proof mechanisms
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Sybil-Proof Mechanisms
Duration: 00:08:54
Speaker: Christoph Schlegel
Type: Lightning Talk
Expertise: Intermediate
Event: Devcon
Date: Nov 2024
I discuss a fundamental impossibility result on proposer selection mechanisms: If different actors can generate different value from block proposal (or sequencing) rights, the only sybil-proof and incentive compatible way of assigning proposal rights is through an (arguably centralizing) auction. In other words, any proposer selection mechanism can at most satisfy two out of three fundamental requirements: incentive compatibility, sybil-resistance and decentralization.
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