devcon 7 / the tension between mev and censorship resistance gadgets
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The tension between MEV and Censorship Resistance Gadgets
Duration: 00:24:23
Speaker: Julian Ma
Type: Talk
Expertise: Expert
Event: Devcon
Date: Nov 2024
Although fairly unrelated at first glance, MEV is currently *the* bottleneck for a censorship-resistant Ethereum. This talk will first explore why MEV and censorship resistance are fundamentally counterforces. Then, we will dive into how MEV constrains the design space of censorship-resistant gadgets like Inclusion Lists and Concurrent Block Producers. What does the future of censorship resistance look like for Ethereum?
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