devcon 7 / superliquid mechanisms for decentralized stablecoins
Duration: 00:25:33
Speaker: Ariah Klages-Mundt
Type: Talk
Expertise: Intermediate
Event: Devcon
Date: Nov 2024
Designing Autonomous Markets for Stablecoin Monetary Policy
We discuss the design of primary (i.e., minting and redemption) market mechanisms for non-custodial stablecoins. We first introduce a new analytical tool, the *redemption curve*, which represents the redemption price as a function of redemption pressure. We use it to discuss historical de-peggings (e.g. in DAI, UST). We then describe a new dynamic redemption curve with desirable robustness properties and show how to implement a primary market based on this curve. The system is part of Gyroscope.
Navigating Stablecoin Yields and Risks
This panel brings DeFi experts together to discuss stablecoin risks, including economic risks related to stabilisation methods, technical risks of smart contracts, and regulatory challenges. We will discuss solutions that can help mitigate risks in this rapidly evolving space and the challenges of promoting risk-driven decisions over trend-driven ones.
Security Risks in DeFi: Delineating Technical and Economic Security
The frenetic evolution of DeFi makes it hard to understand its principles and risks. In our talk, We delineate DeFi along the axes of primitives, protocol types and security risks. We distinguish technical security, which has a healthy literature, from economic security, which is largely unexplored, connecting the latter with new models and thereby synthesizing insights from computer science and economics. Finally, we outline the open research challenges across these security types.
Demand-based recurring fees in practice
ALL 4 letter .COMs have been taken since 2013. Yet most only have a few natural buyers; hence, speculation doesn't make that market more efficient. Yet, in crypto-economics, we can already transcend private property to deter the monopolization of digital assets like domains. This talk explores solutions from Weyl, Posner, and Henry George. We'll show how pricing and allocative efficiency can be improved through Georgist land value tax for assets like real estate, domain names, or ad space.
Deep Dive the LP Pricing
Accurate and robust oracle pricing is the backbone of DeFi. However, LP token prices can easily be manipulated if not calculated correctly. In this talk, I will focus on how to calculate a "fair price" for LP tokens, ensuring security and accuracy. This includes LP token pricing for various protocols such as Uniswap V2, Uniswap V3, Trader Joe v2, Curve – sharing insights and implementations from my experience developing Alpha Homora, Stella, INIT Capital and INFINIT.
A Modest Proposal for Ethereum 2.0
Vitalik Buterin gives his talk titled, "A Modest Proposal for Ethereum 2.0"
Voting with time commitment
Token-based voting mechanisms employed by DAOs can encounter three potential problems: plutocracy, Sybil attacks and vote buying. If one were to design a voting mechanism from scratch, how does one ensure that these issues are addressed adequately down the road? This talk aims to provide some intuition for the trade-offs faced when tackling these problems in general, and the role of time commitment in alleviating these issues, in particular.
Does Ethereum Really Need PBS? Solving MEV at the app vs the infrastructure layer
In this talk, we will give a brief history of MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) and its influence on enshrining PBS (Proposer Builder Separation) into Ethereum. We will explore the Ethereum community’s evolving perspectives on PBS while looking at successful outcomes, unexpected consequences, and alternate solutions. Ultimately, the talk will provocatively ask: does Ethereum really need PBS at all?
Latency Advantage in CEX-DEX Arbitrage
We study the effects of having latency advantage in the CEX-DEX arbitrage in the first-come first-serve transaction ordering policies. We search for optimal strategies for a trader that owns such advantage. To find optimal strategies, we simulate price changes on CEX using real data and assume DEX price does not change in the latency advantage interval. We find that optimal strategy can even be to trade right away as soon as the price difference crosses a threshold where trading is profitable
Nano-payments on Ethereum
Piotr Janiu of Golem (http://golemproject.net/) presents on Nano-payments on the Ethereum blockchain