devcon 7 / voting with time commitment
- YouTube
- Details
Voting with time commitment
Duration: 00:25:34
Speaker: Vijay Mohan
Type: Talk
Expertise: Intermediate
Event: Devcon
Date: Nov 2024
Token-based voting mechanisms employed by DAOs can encounter three potential problems: plutocracy, Sybil attacks and vote buying. If one were to design a voting mechanism from scratch, how does one ensure that these issues are addressed adequately down the road? This talk aims to provide some intuition for the trade-offs faced when tackling these problems in general, and the role of time commitment in alleviating these issues, in particular.
- Related
Devcon
Talk
30:33
A Modest Proposal for Ethereum 2.0
Vitalik Buterin gives his talk titled, "A Modest Proposal for Ethereum 2.0"
Devcon
Talk
22:18
Demand-based recurring fees in practice
ALL 4 letter .COMs have been taken since 2013. Yet most only have a few natural buyers; hence, speculation doesn't make that market more efficient. Yet, in crypto-economics, we can already transcend private property to deter the monopolization of digital assets like domains. This talk explores solutions from Weyl, Posner, and Henry George. We'll show how pricing and allocative efficiency can be improved through Georgist land value tax for assets like real estate, domain names, or ad space.
Devcon
Talk
25:33
Superliquid Mechanisms for Decentralized Stablecoins
USDC and USDT outpace decentralized stablecoins in large part due to their liquidity. This talk covers the theory, data, and risks of stablecoin liquidity innovations. This will include mint/redemption mechanism design, liquidity pool design, rehypothecation, and protocol-owned liquidity. The analysis will distill how the flexibility of decentralized stablecoin issuance mechanisms can safely be used to their advantage over centralized stablecoins, which Gyroscope v2 is putting into practice.
Devcon
Lightning Talk
24:35
Does Ethereum Really Need PBS? Solving MEV at the app vs the infrastructure layer
In this talk, we will give a brief history of MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) and its influence on enshrining PBS (Proposer Builder Separation) into Ethereum. We will explore the Ethereum community’s evolving perspectives on PBS while looking at successful outcomes, unexpected consequences, and alternate solutions. Ultimately, the talk will provocatively ask: does Ethereum really need PBS at all?
Devcon
Talk
17:05
Nano-payments on Ethereum
Piotr Janiu of Golem (http://golemproject.net/) presents on Nano-payments on the Ethereum blockchain
Devcon
Talk
30:36
The CBC Casper Roadmap
The CBC Casper roadmap is a plan to implement Proof-of-Stake and Sharding for Ethereum using “correct-by-construction” (CBC) software design methodology. This talk will share new CBC Casper research, including specifications for light clients, liveness and sharding. It will include updates on formal verification and engineering efforts, and a roadmap for (eventual) release.
Devcon
Talk
26:39
Fair combinatorial auction for trade intents: how to design mechanisms without a numeraire
When designing mechanisms on the blockchain, there may be no single asset that can be used to reallocate the benefits of participating in the mechanism among its participants. Hence, the designer cannot separately address achieving an objective and sharing the resulting gains, as the objective affects how/whether these gains can be shared. This raises fairness concerns. We discuss the relevance of this issue for trade intent auctions and propose a novel mechanism: the fair combinatorial auction.
Devcon
Talk
22:54
Bootstrapping a block builder
The sessions aims to be a practical overview of how to go from zero to having a running and reasonably competitive builder (profits may vary). It aims to answer the following questions: - What software to run? How can this be customized? - What would need to go into writing a builder from the ground up? - How does one acquire orderflow? What is the relative value of various sources of orderflow? - What infrastructure is required? How much does it cost?
Devcon
Lightning Talk
06:14
Comparing Slashing Penalties on Proof-of-Stake Networks
With the support of the Ethereum Foundation, we have performed an analysis of slashing penalties on the seventy largest proof-of-stake cryptocurrency networks. Using insights from institutional economics and game theory, we consider variance in slashing penalties in terms of the conditions that trigger slashing, the magnitude of penalties contemplated, and the limited cases where human judgment plays a role in determining such penalties.
Devcon
Lightning Talk
08:33
Deep Dive the LP Pricing
Accurate and robust oracle pricing is the backbone of DeFi. However, LP token prices can easily be manipulated if not calculated correctly. In this talk, I will focus on how to calculate a "fair price" for LP tokens, ensuring security and accuracy. This includes LP token pricing for various protocols such as Uniswap V2, Uniswap V3, Trader Joe v2, Curve – sharing insights and implementations from my experience developing Alpha Homora, Stella, INIT Capital and INFINIT.