devcon 7 / searcher competition in block building
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Searcher Competition in Block Building
Duration: 00:09:59
Speaker: Akaki Mamageishvili
Type: Lightning Talk
Expertise: Intermediate
Event: Devcon
Date: Nov 2024
We study the amount of MEV captured by validators, as a function of searcher competition. The core is a suitable solution concept in this context that makes robust predictions independent of implementation details or specific mechanisms chosen. The surplus share of validators is a function of searcher competition. Searchers can obtain at most the marginal value increase of the winning block relative to the best block that can be built without them. We validate the theory empirically.
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