devcon 7 / oracles for number values
Duration: 00:25:38
Speaker: William George
Type: Talk
Expertise: Intermediate
Event: Devcon
Date: Nov 2024
Categories
Economic Incentives and Souls in Schelling-point Based Oracles
Schelling-point based oracles, such as Kleros, can be used to attribute soulbound tokens (SBTs) to individuals based on subjective evaluations of their backgrounds and expertise. Moreover, mechanisms using SBTs can complement economic incentives in such oracles; for example, an SBT-conscious random selection process can determine the voters on a given question. We will focus on how the interplay of economic and social elements in such systems can be designed to maximize resistance to attacks.
A Modest Proposal for Ethereum 2.0
Vitalik Buterin gives his talk titled, "A Modest Proposal for Ethereum 2.0"
Sybil-Proof Mechanisms
I discuss a fundamental impossibility result on proposer selection mechanisms: If different actors can generate different value from block proposal (or sequencing) rights, the only sybil-proof and incentive compatible way of assigning proposal rights is through an (arguably centralizing) auction. In other words, any proposer selection mechanism can at most satisfy two out of three fundamental requirements: incentive compatibility, sybil-resistance and decentralization.
A DAG-Based Mechanism for Fairer and More Decentralized Reward Distribution
Ethereum rewards validators for their correct and timely votes, incentivizing honest behavior and ensuring security. Although Ethereum has advanced large-scale decentralization, its current mechanism for verifying timely attestations is not entirely decentralized. This presentation highlights a bottleneck in Ethereum's reward distribution that could compromise LMD GHOST security. We propose a distributed DAG-based reward mechanism to enhance security, fairness, and incentive compatibility.
Nano-payments on Ethereum
Piotr Janiu of Golem (http://golemproject.net/) presents on Nano-payments on the Ethereum blockchain
Based Preconfirmations with MR-MEV-Boost
In this talk, we will analyze a simple strawman setup of based preconfirmations to highlight its challenges, such as supply chain centralization, the lack of pricing mechanisms, and latency/spam races. We will then introduce MR-MEV-Boost, a preconfirmation solution that runs multiple rounds of MEV-Boost auctions within a single slot. This solution addresses the mentioned challenges by preconfirming batches instead of individual transactions and better integrating with the L1 PBS pipeline.
The CBC Casper Roadmap
The CBC Casper roadmap is a plan to implement Proof-of-Stake and Sharding for Ethereum using “correct-by-construction” (CBC) software design methodology. This talk will share new CBC Casper research, including specifications for light clients, liveness and sharding. It will include updates on formal verification and engineering efforts, and a roadmap for (eventual) release.
Demand-based recurring fees in practice
ALL 4 letter .COMs have been taken since 2013. Yet most only have a few natural buyers; hence, speculation doesn't make that market more efficient. Yet, in crypto-economics, we can already transcend private property to deter the monopolization of digital assets like domains. This talk explores solutions from Weyl, Posner, and Henry George. We'll show how pricing and allocative efficiency can be improved through Georgist land value tax for assets like real estate, domain names, or ad space.
Fair combinatorial auction for trade intents: how to design mechanisms without a numeraire
When designing mechanisms on the blockchain, there may be no single asset that can be used to reallocate the benefits of participating in the mechanism among its participants. Hence, the designer cannot separately address achieving an objective and sharing the resulting gains, as the objective affects how/whether these gains can be shared. This raises fairness concerns. We discuss the relevance of this issue for trade intent auctions and propose a novel mechanism: the fair combinatorial auction.
Next Generation AMMs - Eliminating LVR
Loss-Versus-Rebalancing (LVR) is the most significant form of MEV, yet it has the fewest solutions addressing it. LVR remains a significant challenge for AMMs. This session delves into a comprehensive analysis of how CoW AMM addresses the problem of LVR through its unique batch mechanism. Drawing from 9 months of empirical data, the talk will explore the effectiveness of CoW AMM in mitigating LVR and offer insights into the impact of LVR resistant design on trading outcomes and market efficiency