devcon 7 / bootstrapping a block builder
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Bootstrapping a block builder
Duration: 00:22:54
Speaker: Sean Anderson
Type: Talk
Expertise: Intermediate
Event: Devcon
Date: Nov 2024
The sessions aims to be a practical overview of how to go from zero to having a running and reasonably competitive builder (profits may vary). It aims to answer the following questions:
- What software to run? How can this be customized?
- What would need to go into writing a builder from the ground up?
- How does one acquire orderflow? What is the relative value of various sources of orderflow?
- What infrastructure is required? How much does it cost?
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