devcon 7 / based preconfirmations with mr mev boost
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Based Preconfirmations with MR-MEV-Boost
Duration: 00:09:51
Speaker: Lin Oshitani
Type: Lightning Talk
Expertise: Intermediate
Event: Devcon
Date: Nov 2024
In this talk, we will analyze a simple strawman setup of based preconfirmations to highlight its challenges, such as supply chain centralization, the lack of pricing mechanisms, and latency/spam races. We will then introduce MR-MEV-Boost, a preconfirmation solution that runs multiple rounds of MEV-Boost auctions within a single slot. This solution addresses the mentioned challenges by preconfirming batches instead of individual transactions and better integrating with the L1 PBS pipeline.
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