

# Motivation

Imagine a zero knowledge airdrop

Or an anon message board with heated back and forth threads

Or anon voting within some anonymity set

... Or any sybil resistant anon application

## Anonymous Airdrops using ZK proofs

stealthdrop.xyz is an airdrop utility by 0xPARC (Aayush, Adhyyan, Nalin) that enables ERC20 token airdrops that can be claimed by completely anonymous accounts.

*EDIT:* @0xB07DAD discovered a vulnerability in this scheme described in more detail [here](#). Fix and more to follow soon!



**heyanon!**

@heyanonxyz

pseudonymous group characters.

post on @EthereumOGs, @DF\_Winners, @Gr13ZK, @0xPARCHackWeek, @TheZKGuild

discuss: discord.gg/kmKAC5T6sV

heyanon.xyz Joined March 2022

Motiv

Imagine

Or an ar

Or anon

... Or any

**antimatter15** 02/15/2022  
Yeah but like hash the public key with some random input string

**Adhyyan** 02/15/2022  
then someone could brute force all pub keys and check

**antimatter15** 02/15/2022  
Oh I guess that's not that much entropy right

**Adhyyan** 02/15/2022  
especially since the pub keys are all public in the js code  
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**antimatter15** 02/15/2022  
Hmm yeah it feels like there's probably not a way to derive a nullifier here

**Adhyyan** 02/15/2022  
is there no way to generate and verify a unique signature? (edited)  
i remember BTC having a problem with malleable sigs. how did they solve it?

**yush** 02/15/2022  
unless our zk proof subsumes another zk proof that k is properly generated from the private key, signature uniqueness

@Adhyyan is there no way to generate and verify a unique signature? (edited)

**antimatter15** 02/15/2022  
seems like not <https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/26974/verifiably-deterministic-ecdsa-signatures>

Cryptography Stack Exchange

### Verifiably deterministic ECDSA signatures?

ECDSA signatures depend on parameter  $k$  that is chosen by the signer. As a result, there are many signatures for the same private key  $d$  and message  $m$ .

What I want to achieve is a deterministic sign...

**yush** 02/15/2022  
funnily enough eddsa does not require the use of a unique random number for each signature, in which case we'd be go

**antimatter15** 02/15/2022  
but an adversary could still create arbitrarily many signatures with the same key which are valid  
seems like the ethereum spec says that signatures are supposed to be made with deterministic ecdsa, but an adversary

**yush** 02/15/2022  
right exactly, that's what we are concerned with for ecdsa -- are you saying that's also true for eddsa?

**antimatter15** 02/15/2022  
oh i misread, but is eddsa relevant?

**yush** 02/15/2022  
oh no, it was just an interesting observation

**Adhyyan** 02/15/2022  
Is there anything about ecdsa which is deterministic? We could use that for nullifiers for eg. if there's some internal value not related to  $k$ , we could use that

**yyan** i remember BTC having a problem with malleable sigs. how did they solve it?

**ter15** 02/15/2022  
illy seems to be a related but not exactly the same concept. malleability seems to refer to whether someone can alter a signature and create a  $e$  without possessing the private key. it seems like what we need is "signature uniqueness" i.e. only one signature exists for a given secret key  $isage$ .

**imatter15** looks like EdDSA still employs a nonce, but it just specifies how that nonce is supposed to be generated (akin to deterministic ECDSA)

02/15/2022  
you're right; I looked at the full sig construction and it seems EDDSA suffers from the exact same issue  
does it seem to me that a unique signature scheme verifiable without a private key is impossible; either 1) it derives only from the public key, in which case it can be brute forced, or 2) it utilizes some deterministically seeded randomness, but the only possible deterministic, unknown random seed is the secret key

**sp** 02/15/2022  
right—we should prolly post this lol

02/15/2022  
we need to realize that it's worth thinking through which class of "zk-id" applications need nullifiers vs. not (edited)

**ter15** 02/15/2022  
nullifiers are less useful in general than one would expect for ECDSA in ZK, such as in the nft gated discord example because eg the owner can't get access and subsequence  
February 19, 2022  
it's a sense in which t

**gubsheep** 02/19/2022  
Big news y'all. Me and @phated just met with the snaps lead and they have wasm working on a branch and are super excited for wasm support, which enables zk/snarkjs <- metamask stuff. Zk airdrop and others could be a reality within the next 6mo 🤩 cc @lsankar @antimatter15 @yi @nibnalin @viviboop and more (edited)


**ter15** 02/15/2022  
 6

02/15/2022  
the point we may want  
**justin** 02/19/2022  
the sad thing about how this is playing out is that snaps will never be compatible with hardware wallets

it's deterministically i  
d 'deterministic sigs'  
**antimatter15** 02/19/2022  
or new hardware wallets will have to adapt to have beefier compute cores that can do snark stuff

**i032 - Edwards-Cur**  
ds-Curve Digital Signat  
**@justin** the sad thing about how this is playing out is that snaps will never be compatible with hardware wallets  
**gubsheep** 02/19/2022  
I also chatted with EF security team about this

n 02/15/2022  
e brainstorming for s  
**@antimatter15** or new hardware wallets will have to adapt to have beefier compute cores that can do snark stuff  
**justin** 02/19/2022  
yep but then the price of secure enclaves will explode

think this would work  
**gubsheep** 02/19/2022  
I want to bring them into the next learning group  
**ter15** 02/15/2022  
those lines i wonder if  
someone generates a  
 1

that could even be dr  
**justin** 02/19/2022  
so if I'm following correctly, the reason we don't use the circuit based on sigs anymore is that we can't do nullifiers properly + it's much more expensive, right?  
or maybe we can break the circuit in pieces  
do the part dealing with the private key on the enclave, and the rest on the host computer  
but I don't know much about composing circuits that way



# a new zk nullifier scheme for ECDSA

with **Aayush Gupta, Kobi Gurkan, Wei Jie Koh, Lakshman Sankar**

Personae Labs

Geometry Research

Personae Labs

inspired by discussions with [nalin](#)/[adhyyan](#)/[gubsheep](#)/[uma](#)/[boneh](#)/[vivek](#)

work originally done at 0xPARC/MIT

# Properties we want

Unique

Deterministic

Verifiable without secret key

Noninteractive (unlike [tornado.cash](#) or [semaphore](#))

# Ideas that will and won't work

deterministic ECDSA signatures

VUFs/unique signatures

hash(message, public key)

hash(message, secret key)

hash(message, public key)<sup>secret key</sup> -> DDH-VRF!

**We want a deterministic function of a user's secret key, that can be verified with only their public key, and keeps them anonymous**

# Solution

If your eth keypair is  $(sk, pk = g^{sk})$  and public message is  $m$

Signature:

public:  $hash[m, pk]^{sk}$  <-- nullifier

private:  $c = hash2(g, pk, hash[m, pk], hash[m, pk]^{sk}, g^r, hash[m, pk]^r)$

$$s = r + sk * c$$

$$pk = g^{sk}$$

$g^r$  [optional output]

$hash[m, pk]^r$  [optional output]

Verifier check in SNARK:

$$g^{[r + sk * c]} / (g^{sk})^c = g^r$$

$$hash[m, g^{sk}]^{[r + sk * c]} / (hash[m, pk]^{sk})^c = hash[m, pk]^r$$

$$c = hash2(g, g^{sk}, hash[m, g^{sk}], hash[m, pk]^{sk}, g^r, hash[m, pk]^r)$$

pk is in anonymity set (merkle proof)

# Quantum Secrecy - Interactivity Tradeoff

Noninteractive

Quantum secrecy

---

ZK Nullifiers

?

Semaphore

**Key:** If nullifier = any deterministic function(secret key), a future quantum adversary can break *past* anonymity.

But if we source randomness beyond the secret key, the user needs to remember that value (password).



# Quantum oracles that can break ECDSA

Between 30-never years. Maybe average somewhere around 2100??

Shors -> prime factorization and discrete log. No hashes.

Requires 2330 signal qubits *plus* noise correction.

As of 2022, we currently have < 20 signal qubits.

1 pager with [my mental model here](#).

# Understanding

Paper with proofs: EUF-CMA, secrecy, uniqueness (done)  
tl;dr if you can break this, you can break Diffie-Hellman

Blog post (done)

Proof of concept (done)

Integrate into wallets: Burner wallet, Metamask in progress


Create an ERC/EIP standard

IETF RFC Appendix Addition

Repo: [github.com/zk-nullifier-sig/zk-nullifier-sig](https://github.com/zk-nullifier-sig/zk-nullifier-sig)



[@yush\\_g](https://twitter.com/yush_g) [@personae\\_labs](https://twitter.com/personae_labs)



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Section 1

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Section 2

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# Here's the timeline.

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# Thank you!

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Your title, your organization

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