

# MEV-capturing AMMs

Federico Giacon

Smart contract developer at CoW Swap

# Maximal extractable value (MEV)

Block builders can **include, exclude, and reorder transactions** in a block.

MEV is the value extracted on top of fees and rewards.

# Sandwich attack

*Block*

*User tx*


Sell 100 ETH for  
100,000 USDC  
(max 1% slippage)

...



...

# Sandwich attack



# Loss versus rebalancing

<b>Market</b>	1 ETH = 1400 DAI
<b>AMM</b>	1 ETH → 1400 DAI

# Loss versus rebalancing

Market	1 ETH = 1400 DAI
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Market	1 ETH = <b>1300</b> DAI
AMM	1 ETH → 1400 DAI

## Loss versus rebalancing

LVR is an information cost to the liquidity provider: the pool doesn't have access to current market prices.

This is **not** impermanent loss!

Market	1 ETH = <b>1300</b> DAI
AMM	1 ETH → 1400 DAI



## A concrete example

Build an AMM that auctions off the right to the first transaction to the highest bidder (*lead searcher*).

Proceeds go to liquidity providers.

- Lead searcher captures LVR instead of block builders!

Arbitrageur



<i>Trades</i>
MEV-extracting trade
Trade 2
Trade 3
...



# Enforcing first transaction right

No users can trade until the lead searcher has traded—otherwise the transaction **x** reverts **x**.

Block builder cooperation needed: the lead searcher transaction is included before any trade.

- Incentive: if the transaction doesn't revert then it uses more gas.

*AMM*

Lead searcher: searcher

*Block*

Tx 1: searcher trades ✓  
Tx 2: user\_1 trades ✓  
Tx 3: user\_2 trades ✓  
Tx 4: user\_3 trades ✓  
...

*Block*

Tx 1: user\_1 trades ✗  
Tx 2: user\_2 trades ✗  
Tx 3: searcher trades ✓  
Tx 4: user\_3 trades ✓  
...

# Cost analysis

Estimated MEV **profit** for lead searcher: **+9** \$/block

- Based on the value of the first transaction slot on the Eden network


Estimated additional **costs**: **-3** \$/block

- From the extra gas cost of enforcing AMM rules (*much lower in L2!*)

Expected **captured MEV** on mainnet: **+6** \$/block

Details: <https://ethresear.ch/t/mev-capturing-amm-mcamm/13336>

# MEV extraction potential



Source: <https://transparency.flashbots.net>

# Conclusion

AMMs have hidden fees:

- for users: sandwich attacks
- for liquidity providers: loss versus rebalancing (LVR)


In current AMM designs, these fees are paid to arbitrageurs and block builders.

Goal: efficient AMM designs that distribute these fees away from block builders.

Join the discussion!

<https://ethresear.ch/t/mev-capturing-amm-mcamm/13336>





# Thank you!

Speaker:

**Federico Giacon**

[federico@cow.fi](mailto:federico@cow.fi)

An idea from:

**Alexander Herrmann**

[alex@cow.fi](mailto:alex@cow.fi)

