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devcon8 / where to hide wormholes beacon deposits and the cost of deniability

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Where to Hide: Wormholes, Beacon Deposits, and the Cost of Deniability preview
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Where to Hide: Wormholes, Beacon Deposits, and the Cost of Deniability

Duration: NaN:NaN:NaN

Speaker: Mo Jahanara

Type: Lightning Talk

Expertise: Some familiarity with the topic

Event: Devcon

Date: Nov 2026

I start by reminding everyone of the definition of plausible deniability and why it is a very desirable property! The I explain wormholes derive a burn address from a user secret, where non-inflation rests on 160-bit collision resistance. One collision mints the same deposit twice. That gives us only an unsatisfying 80 bits of security. Then, I make a formal argument why without longer addresses it is impossible to fix low security problem. After that I pitch EIP-8222 as an alternative, which adds a two-phase deposit and withdrawal to the staking contract, with 256-bit long commitments that never touch execution-layer addresses, so security reduces to proof soundness. Finally, I close by explaining how "the extremely lean chain" proposal by Vitalik reaches a similar place as a byproduct of state minimization.

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