devcon 7 / start contributing to economic protocol development
Duration: 00:07:03
Speaker: Julian Ma
Type: Lightning Talk
Expertise: Beginner
Event: Devcon
Date: Nov 2024
The tension between MEV and Censorship Resistance Gadgets
Although fairly unrelated at first glance, MEV is currently *the* bottleneck for a censorship-resistant Ethereum. This talk will first explore why MEV and censorship resistance are fundamentally counterforces. Then, we will dive into how MEV constrains the design space of censorship-resistant gadgets like Inclusion Lists and Concurrent Block Producers. What does the future of censorship resistance look like for Ethereum?
Exploring Auction Mechanisms in Protocol Design
Auction mechanisms are fascinating, and so are protocol designs. When you put both together, things get really interesting. In this talk, we'll dive into various auction mechanisms and see how they shape protocol design choices. We'll cover key aspects like the timing game, MEV burn, and participant trusts. Then we will look at case studies: Ethereum, Optimism, and Arbitrum. For each case, we'll conclude how protocol impacts auction or vice versa.
Nano-payments on Ethereum
Piotr Janiu of Golem (http://golemproject.net/) presents on Nano-payments on the Ethereum blockchain
A Modest Proposal for Ethereum 2.0
Vitalik Buterin gives his talk titled, "A Modest Proposal for Ethereum 2.0"
ETH is permissionless money
ETH is money! In this talk, we will explore the role of Ethereum's native asset on the base chain, in the L2 ecosystems, and in crypto broadly. We discuss the ETH supply, what it means to be permissionless money, how ETH is being used today, and how it's role can evolve.
Agent-based modeling of Execution Tickets
Execution Tickets are currently debated as one of the most promising approaches to streamline incentives at protocol level. We created a holistic overview of potential mechanism designs and implementing an agent-based model to realistically compare different mechanism designs and identify potential drawbacks early on. The agent-based modeling approach is presented together with the results. In the second part, we will guide through running the simulation in the workshop.
Comparing Slashing Penalties on Proof-of-Stake Networks
With the support of the Ethereum Foundation, we have performed an analysis of slashing penalties on the seventy largest proof-of-stake cryptocurrency networks. Using insights from institutional economics and game theory, we consider variance in slashing penalties in terms of the conditions that trigger slashing, the magnitude of penalties contemplated, and the limited cases where human judgment plays a role in determining such penalties.
A Conservative Approach to a Radical Roadmap
The current Ethereum 2.0 roadmap is doing a lot of great work on many fronts such as research on VDFs, data availability proofs, and multi-execution environments. However, as an active observer of the Ethereum 2.0 roadmap development over the past 2 years, I am concerned with some of the choices in roadmap strategy, particularly its approach to radically transforming a network with over $30B of value and hundreds of applications depending on it. In this talk, I will present an alternative, more conservative view of how to approach the Ethereum 2.0 roadmap. Some of the topics covered will include: - Radical vs Conservative technological upgrade paths. - We should use Ethereum 1.x as the beacon chain instead of launching a new beacon chain. - Proof of Stake is highly experimental. We should test Proof of Stake on shards before using it on the beacon chain. - Why requiring a 1-way peg burn of ETH to stake is scary. - Learnings from 3 months of Proof of Stake on Cosmos - Why we NEED delegation *in-protocol* - Why sharding doesn't solve social scalability.
Economics of Ethereum 2.0
This will be a presentation reviewing the Ethereum 2.0 Economics for an average validator. The talk will highlight the validator economics based on the current spec that can be expected for Phase 0 and Ethereum 2.0 at a mature state. The presentation will result in a call for community feedback on the proposed economics, which will be done through a public facing Ethereum 2.0 calculator built by the EF and ConsenSys.
Shouldn’t we rethink debt? What DeFi can learn from susu’s and immigrant lending clubs
With hundreds of millions collateralized in products like Compound Finance and Maker, the Ethereum community is rightfully rallying around #DeFi. Yet, one could easily draw portentous parallels to the systemic risks of financial innovations in the early 2000s: credit default swaps, hybrid securities, and so on. In this lightning talk I will implore our community to look toward another concept of lending used around the world: the susu. The susu (tanda in Latin America, hui in Asia, or a “rotating savings and credit association: ROSCA), is a type of short-term no-interest loan among members of a small community. Each person in the susu makes the same contribution to the pool of money, and on a rotating basis, one person receives the total amount added to the pool. I first encountered this concept when visiting my partner’s family in Trinidad and Tobago, and am studying how communities in NYC rely on these informal lending clubs to pay for a flight, a home down-payment, or just for fun. If Ethereum will bring greater financial access, we should focus less on imitating the sophisticated financial products of Wall Street and instead look to the ways that communities without financial access already get by.