devcon 7 / how much security does your restaking protocol really need
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How much security does your restaking protocol really need?
Duration: 00:25:21
Speaker: Tarun Chitra
Type: Talk
Expertise: Expert
Event: Devcon
Date: Nov 2024
Restaking protocols have aggregated millions of ETH with the hope of securing new infrastructure on Ethereum. These services, such as ZK provers and oracles, require restaking ETH to enforce custom slashing rules. But how much ETH do these services need? And how much risk do these services place on Ethereum L1? We will formulate a mathematical model for answering these questions and present an empirical analysis of cascading risks from restaking services to Ethereum, with a positive outlook!
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