devcon 7 / beyond multidimensional fee markets
Duration: 00:25:48
Speaker: Maryam Bahrani
Type: Talk
Expertise: Expert
Event: Devcon
Date: Nov 2024
Deep Dive the LP Pricing
Accurate and robust oracle pricing is the backbone of DeFi. However, LP token prices can easily be manipulated if not calculated correctly. In this talk, I will focus on how to calculate a "fair price" for LP tokens, ensuring security and accuracy. This includes LP token pricing for various protocols such as Uniswap V2, Uniswap V3, Trader Joe v2, Curve – sharing insights and implementations from my experience developing Alpha Homora, Stella, INIT Capital and INFINIT.
How much security does your restaking protocol really need?
Restaking protocols have aggregated millions of ETH with the hope of securing new infrastructure on Ethereum. These services, such as ZK provers and oracles, require restaking ETH to enforce custom slashing rules. But how much ETH do these services need? And how much risk do these services place on Ethereum L1? We will formulate a mathematical model for answering these questions and present an empirical analysis of cascading risks from restaking services to Ethereum, with a positive outlook!
Nano-payments on Ethereum
Piotr Janiu of Golem (http://golemproject.net/) presents on Nano-payments on the Ethereum blockchain
A Modest Proposal for Ethereum 2.0
Vitalik Buterin gives his talk titled, "A Modest Proposal for Ethereum 2.0"
Demand-based recurring fees in practice
ALL 4 letter .COMs have been taken since 2013. Yet most only have a few natural buyers; hence, speculation doesn't make that market more efficient. Yet, in crypto-economics, we can already transcend private property to deter the monopolization of digital assets like domains. This talk explores solutions from Weyl, Posner, and Henry George. We'll show how pricing and allocative efficiency can be improved through Georgist land value tax for assets like real estate, domain names, or ad space.
Start contributing to economic protocol development
Protocol development needs more economists, yet many potential contributors do not know which problems are important to Ethereum protocol development. This talk bridges the gap for those interested in blockchain research who want to work on impactful problems. The talk will overview different economic research areas at the protocol level. Examples include an economic perspective on consensus systems, transaction fee mechanism design, and economic sides of current EIPs.
A proposer's perspective on preconfirmations: a new game in town?
This talk will provide a node operator's perspective on the preconf transaction pipeline by examining incentives and infrastructure best practices. Specifically, ways node operators may attempt to earn higher revenues than peers through custom optimizations will be discussed alongside, related risks, and potential mitigations.
Agent-based modeling of Execution Tickets
Execution Tickets are currently debated as one of the most promising approaches to streamline incentives at protocol level. We created a holistic overview of potential mechanism designs and implementing an agent-based model to realistically compare different mechanism designs and identify potential drawbacks early on. The agent-based modeling approach is presented together with the results. In the second part, we will guide through running the simulation in the workshop.
AMMs as Managed, Customized Portfolios
When you provide liquidity to a Uniswap or Balancer pool, what financial product are you actually buying? This talk considers automated market makers from the perspective of liquidity providers. We first mathematically describe the underlying financial derivative that LP positions represent. Then, we show how to use AMMs to construct custom financial derivatives, specified by their payoff function, and discuss implications.
Comparing Slashing Penalties on Proof-of-Stake Networks
With the support of the Ethereum Foundation, we have performed an analysis of slashing penalties on the seventy largest proof-of-stake cryptocurrency networks. Using insights from institutional economics and game theory, we consider variance in slashing penalties in terms of the conditions that trigger slashing, the magnitude of penalties contemplated, and the limited cases where human judgment plays a role in determining such penalties.