devcon 7 / agent based modeling of execution tickets
Duration: 01:21:35
Speaker: Pascal Stichler
Type: Workshop
Expertise: Intermediate
Event: Devcon
Date: Nov 2024
Is multi-block MEV a thing? Insights from 2 years of MEV Boost Data
Multi-block MEV describes MEV that arises from one party controlling several consecutive slots. Currently, it is discussed as a potential blocker for several prominent mechanism designs. We analyzed two years of MEV boost data covering more than 5 million slots to investigate historical patterns of it. Amongst other findings we see less multi-slot sequences occur than randomly feasible however that payments for longer sequences are higher than average.
A Modest Proposal for Ethereum 2.0
Vitalik Buterin gives his talk titled, "A Modest Proposal for Ethereum 2.0"
Comparing Slashing Penalties on Proof-of-Stake Networks
With the support of the Ethereum Foundation, we have performed an analysis of slashing penalties on the seventy largest proof-of-stake cryptocurrency networks. Using insights from institutional economics and game theory, we consider variance in slashing penalties in terms of the conditions that trigger slashing, the magnitude of penalties contemplated, and the limited cases where human judgment plays a role in determining such penalties.
Practical endgame on issuance policy
A practical endgame on issuance policy stops the growth in stake while guaranteeing proper consensus incentives and positive regular rewards to solo stakers. Viable reward curves for this endgame are presented. Motivations, impacts and potential downsides of an issuance reduction are in focus. A tangible framework is also introduced: never exceed an issuance rate of 0.5%. A stringent cap on issuance caps the inflation rate, solidifying ETH as trustless sound money with robust economic security.
Latency Advantage in CEX-DEX Arbitrage
We study the effects of having latency advantage in the CEX-DEX arbitrage in the first-come first-serve transaction ordering policies. We search for optimal strategies for a trader that owns such advantage. To find optimal strategies, we simulate price changes on CEX using real data and assume DEX price does not change in the latency advantage interval. We find that optimal strategy can even be to trade right away as soon as the price difference crosses a threshold where trading is profitable
Nano-payments on Ethereum
Piotr Janiu of Golem (http://golemproject.net/) presents on Nano-payments on the Ethereum blockchain
The CBC Casper Roadmap
The CBC Casper roadmap is a plan to implement Proof-of-Stake and Sharding for Ethereum using “correct-by-construction” (CBC) software design methodology. This talk will share new CBC Casper research, including specifications for light clients, liveness and sharding. It will include updates on formal verification and engineering efforts, and a roadmap for (eventual) release.
Demand-based recurring fees in practice
ALL 4 letter .COMs have been taken since 2013. Yet most only have a few natural buyers; hence, speculation doesn't make that market more efficient. Yet, in crypto-economics, we can already transcend private property to deter the monopolization of digital assets like domains. This talk explores solutions from Weyl, Posner, and Henry George. We'll show how pricing and allocative efficiency can be improved through Georgist land value tax for assets like real estate, domain names, or ad space.
Next Generation AMMs - Eliminating LVR
Loss-Versus-Rebalancing (LVR) is the most significant form of MEV, yet it has the fewest solutions addressing it. LVR remains a significant challenge for AMMs. This session delves into a comprehensive analysis of how CoW AMM addresses the problem of LVR through its unique batch mechanism. Drawing from 9 months of empirical data, the talk will explore the effectiveness of CoW AMM in mitigating LVR and offer insights into the impact of LVR resistant design on trading outcomes and market efficiency
Start contributing to economic protocol development
Protocol development needs more economists, yet many potential contributors do not know which problems are important to Ethereum protocol development. This talk bridges the gap for those interested in blockchain research who want to work on impactful problems. The talk will overview different economic research areas at the protocol level. Examples include an economic perspective on consensus systems, transaction fee mechanism design, and economic sides of current EIPs.